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THE NEW NORTH DAKOTA PROBATE CODE
W. JEREMY DAvIs*
I. INTRODUCTION
The need to modernize the probate laws of most jurisdictions in
the United States was first documented over three decades ago. In
1940 Professor Atkinson painted his "gloomy picture" of probate and
expressed his feeling that even if an attempt were made to improve
the probate laws, few jurisdictions would adopt them.1 By 1946, the
Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American
Bar Association was able to draft and prepare the Model Probate
Code.2 The Model Code was not meant to be a uniform act, but
rather a "reservoir of ideas '" and while it influenced legislation in
some thirteen states,4 little was done to make uniform the various
procedural and substantive laws of the various states until 1962. In
that year the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the
American Bar Association took the initiative and began work with
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
to draft a Uniform Probate Code based on the Model Code.5
Whether the time lag between the drafting of the Model Code to the
action taken by the ABA was due to the fact that there were more
important problems facing that body or was due to the fact that
there were few incentives for change until the mid-sixties is of
little relevance to any discussion at this point.6 The fact is that
in 1969 the American Bar Association approved the Uniform Pro-
* Assistant Professor Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. B.S.B.A.,
(1964), J.D., (1970) University of Denver.
1. Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 AM, JuR. Soc. J. 183, 189 (1940).
2. L. SIMES & P. BAYSE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW: MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946).
3. Id. at 10.
4. Fratcher, Estate Planning and Administrators Under the Uniform Probatd Code,
110 T. & E. 5 (1971).
5. Id.
6. The public outcry was encouraged, probably justifiably, by Mr. Dacey's suggested
approach to wealth transfer. N. DACEY, How To AvoI PROBATE (1965). There is now no
lack of commentary on the problems of "probate." See M. BLOOM, THE TaOunLE WITH
LAWYERs, OUR UNKNOWN HEIRs 233-63 (1968); Settling an Estate Could be Faster and
Cheaper, 26 CHANGING TIMES No. 11 Nov. 1972, at 6; Let's Rewrite the Probate Laws,
23 CHANGING TIMES, Jan. 1969, at 39.
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bate Code;I since that time, it has been adopted by two state
legislatures 8 and is being studied by many others. 9 The Code
(with a few modifications for compliance with North Dakota Con-
stitutional requirements) was introduced as House Bill No. 1040 to
the Forty-third Legislative Assembly of North Dakota in January
of 1973.0 The bill created a new title 30.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code, which will substantially change several areas of
North Dakota law relating to decedent's estates as well as intro-
duce some new concepts to the administration of North Dakota
estates. This article will discuss selected areas of Title 30.1 and
the Code's effect on North Dakota law.
II. CHANGES IN INTESTATE SUCCESSION UNDER THE CODE
Schemes of intestate distribution, or the estate plan which the
state provides if a decedent fails to, are ordinarily designed for
the distribution of a decedent's estate in the manner which pre-
sumably reflects the normal desires of decedents of average wealth.
The Code is no exception and, while there are some changes from
prior North Dakota law relating to intestate distribution, there are
few conceptual alterations. The chart on the following page compares
the Code with prior law.
As indicated by the chart, the Code differs from the prior law
in several areas. The Code allows the spouse who survives,
with issue of the decedent also surviving, to receive the first $50,000
of the net estate plus one-half the remainder.15 However, if one or
more of the issue surviving are not also issue of the surviving
spouse, then the surviving spouse takes only one-half without also
taking the first $50,000.16 The prior law allowed the straight one-
half share to the surviving spouse without regard to the relation-
ship between the surviving issue of the intestate and the surviving
spouse. 17 Presumably the spouse is legally obligated to care for the
children of a surviving spouse and decedent; the Code allows a
more reasonable share for this purpose.
7. Wellman, The Neto Uniform Probate Code. 56 A.B.A.J. 636 (1970') hereinafter the
Uniform Probate Code will be cited as Code],
8. Idaho was the first state to adopt the Code, (IDA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-101 to
15-7-307 (Supp. 1972)) and Alaska the second (ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 13.06-13.36 (1962)).
9. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE COMMITTEE OF
THE SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW 2 (1970).
10. As this issue was going to press, both houses of the North Dakota legislature had
passed H.B. 1040 and it was awaiting the Governor's signature. When signed into law,
the Code will become effective July 1, 1975.
15. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-02(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04,02(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
17. N.D. Cnm. CODE 1 56-01-04(1)(b) (1972).
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Prior
th Dakota
Law"
niform
robate
Code2
V 0 0 a One-half to spouse; one- One-half to spouse; one-half
half to issue to issue ONLY if one or
more issue surviving is
not also the issue of the
surviving spouse. If all
issue are of decedent and
surviving spouse, then
first $50,000 and one-half
remainder to spouse;
one-half the remainder
to the issue
V 0 V O 0 First $50,000 and one-half Same
remainder to spouse;
one-half remainder to
parents
V 0 0 V 0 First $100,000 and one-half All to spouse
remainder to spouse;
one-half remainder to
brothers and sisters of
decedent
V 0 0 0 0 All to spouse Same
0 V 03 0 1 All to issue Same
0 0 7 3 t All to parents Same
0 0 0 v o All to brothers and Same
sisters of decedent
0 0 0 0 v All to "next of kin" All to grandparents
and their issue
0 0 0 0 0 Escheat to state for Passes to the state14
the support of the
common schools-3
V indicates that a member of that class has survived the intestate.
0 indicates that no member of that class has survived the intestate.
0 indicates that the survival of a member of that class would make no
difference in the distribution.
Another difference between the Code and prior law is that the
prior law provided for decedent's brothers and sisters in the event
he died without issue. A decedent's spouse would receive the first
$100,000 and one-half the remainder, while the decedent's brothers
11. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04 (1972);
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 3u.1-04-02, 03 (effective July 1, 1975).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04(6) (1972).
14. T.D. CEr. CODE § 30.1-04-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
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and sisters would share the other half.'8 Under the Code, gifts to
siblings will have to be made specifically by will, since if there is
no issue, the spouse takes all.19
Finally, the prior law provided for distribution to "next of kin"
after failure of issue of parents and their issue.20 This provision
allows for the "laughing heir" situation; 21 the new Code provision
cuts off distribution after the issue of grandparents and their issue,
denying "laughing heir" status to more remote kin. 2 2
One of the areas in which the Code will hopefully provide clar-
ity is in providing a method for distribution of intestate property
among lineal and collateral heirs, where some or all of the most
closely related heirs predecease the intestate. The confusion inher-
ent in the North Dakota statutes prior to the Code is caused by
the fact that it is unclear when the per capita or one of the several
per stirpes methods of distribution should be used. These methods
of distribution are different in that a per capita distribution allows
each heir to take an equal share with every other heir, regardless
of the degree of heirship to the intestate decedent."3 A strict per
stirpes distribution, on the other hand, is based upon the number
of children that the decedent had living at his death, or that pre-
deceased him with issue surviving. A share is set aside for each
child, or dead child leaving issue, and then is further divided by
the number of lineal descendents of the decedent's children. 24 The
per stirpes method is considered more equitable,' 5 and with some
modification, is the law in most jurisdictions. It is this modifi-
cation which has caused some confusion in the past. Professor
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04(2) & (d) (1972).
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04(4)(a) (1972).
21. The term is usually used to describe an heir far removed from the decedent who
takes the estate because there are no heirs of a closer degree. He .is ordinarily so far
removed from his ancestor that he suffers no feeling of personal loss; hence the term
"laughing heir."
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-03(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
23. For example, suppose X dies intestate leaving a child A, and four grandchildren,
b(1), child of X's deceased child B, and c(1), c(2), and c(3), children of X's deceased
child, C. Each of these heirs would take an equal share under the per capita method of
distribution.
24. In the example given in note 23, supra, under a strict per stirpes method of distribu-
tion A would receive a one-third share, b(1) would also take a one-third share as his
parent's representative, and the children of C would divide C's share, each taking ulti-
mately one-ninth of X's estate.
25. An inequitable result may well be reached when dealing with a strict per stirpes
method. Assume in the example in note 23, supra, that A predeceased X leaving two chil-
dren a(l) and a(2). In that case the only heirs of X are his granchildren; there Is no
reason why the state should presume that X would prefer his grandchildren to be treated
other than equally. Under a strict stirpes distribution however, a(1) and a(2) would each
take one-sixth, b(1) would take one-third, and c(1), c(2) and c(3) each would re-
ceive one-ninth. Most jurisdictions attempt to avoid this treatment by modifying the
strict per stirpes rule where all of decedent's children predecease him, In which case
they require a per capita distribution. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04(1)(b) (1972). -This
Is often called the per stirpes distribution with the per capita exception. Under this
method of distribution, all of X's grandchildren would share equally in his estate if all
of X's children had predeceased him.
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Heckman pointed out the problem in 1969 when he noted the anom-
alous results reached by reading several sections of the Century
Code relating to per stirpes and per capita distribution together.
Such a reading indicated that the Century Code provisions allowed
both methods. 26 The Uniform Probate Code now permits only the
modified per stirpital method, thus resolving this ambiguity.2?
III. PROTECTION OF THE SPOUSE
Some form of protecting spouses of decedents from disinheri-
son has been afforded to widows and (less often) widowers since
early in the common law. Whether by custom, the common law,
or the dictate of the sovereign, the widow has usually been pro-
vided for. As early as the twelfth century, it was recognized that
the wife of a deceased had an enforceable interest in some part
of her late husband's personal property.28 By custom or dictate,
the process of legitim, later called the custom of London, allowed
a decent who died leaving no issue or wife surviving to give
away all of his chattels in any manner he desired. However, if he
left a wife surviving but no issue, or issue but no wife, his chattels
were divided into ,two equal shares: the "dead's part," which was
disposed of by will, and the other part, which was to go to the
surviving wife or children.29 The property of the decedent who left
both a wife and children surviving was divided into three equal
shares: the dead's part, the wife's part, and the "bairn's part."30
The children receiving the bairn's part were required to bring into
hotchpot any advancement before being allowed to share in that
portion of the estate.8' In the 17th century this custom was still
prevalent in Scotland and the City of London 32-hence the name
26. Heckman. The Treatment of Some Traditional Problems of Intestate Successiln
in the North fakota Century Code, 45 N.D. L. REv. 465, 469-71 (1969). Heckmnsn noted
that while N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-04(1) (b) (1972) adopted the modified -per stirpital
method, § 56-01-04(1) (c) (1972) prescribed a strict per stirpes distribution. The only
substantive difference between these two subsections is that the former is applicable to
situations where a spouse, as well as children, survive the intestate, while the latter is
applicable to situations In which only issue survive. While it may be argued that a modi-
fled per stirpital method is better than a strict per stirpital method or vice versa, no
equitable argument can be made for permitting both in situations of such similarity.
27. Ni.). CENT. CODE § 30'.1-04-06 (effective July 1, 1975) states:
If representation is called for by this title, the estate is divided into as many
shares as there are surviving heirs In the nearest degree of kinship and
deceased persons in the same degree who left issue who survive the de-
cedent, each surviving heir in the nearest degree receiving one share and
the share of each deceased person in the same degree being divided among
his issue in the same manner.
28. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 349 (2d ed. 1898).
29. Id. at 348-49.
30. Id. at 348.
31. Id. at 349. "Hotchpot" is a bookkeeping maneuver by which the child whose share
has been anticipated accounts for it before receiving anything from the decedent's es-
tate. See text accompanying notes 85 to 94, infra.
32. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 439.
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Custom of London. There is some commentary supporting the idea
that the Magna Carta provided a statutory base for legitim, but
it was more likely a common law custom.88
On the real property side of the issue was, of course, dower.
As finally refined by the common law courts,34 dower was the right
to retain a life estate in a one-third interest in all the real prop-
erty owned by the husband during coverture.8 5
The custom of legitim has since disappeared from usage and
dower has been abolished by statute. 6 There is no evidence indi-
cating the reasons for the decline and final demise of legitim, but
there need be no speculation on the abolition of the estate of dower.
Its strength was also its downfall. Since the inchoate right of dower
existed upon marriage and lasted until the husband's death, dower
conflicted with the newer and expanding concept of freedom of
alienation. Dower became a clog on titles. No transferee of real
property could be absolutely certain that somewhere in the chain
of title there wasn't a widow. Since the property could not be sold
during the husband's lifetime without the consent of the wife, its
market value declined. As far as providing security for the widow,
that too came under fire from anti-dower forces. Dower was vul-
nerable for several reasons-first, it was applicable only to real
property at a time when wealth was becoming more and more in-
tangible, and secondly, it could be defeated by several methods such
as by taking title in a corporate name with the majority (or sole)
interest being held by the husband.3 7
While dower and curtesy have been abolished in most jurisdic-
tions, state legislatures have usually recognized that there is some
social value in the idea of preventing complete disinheritance of the
spouse. They have enacted forced share election statutes or some
other dower substitute . 8 With the exception of North Dakota and
South Dakota, all the jurisdictions that have abolished dower have
enacted some form of forced share statute in its place. While such
33. Id. at 350, 355.
34. For a history of dower and its various interpretations see F. POLLOCK & F. MArT-
LAND, supra note 28, at 420-28.
35. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129 (1897).
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-09 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-02 (1972). These
statutes have abolished dower and its similar male counterpart, curtesy. The Uniform
Probate Code also abolishes dower and curtesy. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-13 (effective
July 1, 1975).
37. This situation had the effect of a result adverse to the purpose of dower. Dower
was intended to provide financial protection for the widow and allow her to be free from
poverty for her remaining years. If it could be defeated with such simple schemes as
alternative forms of wealth or ownership, dower would exist only where it was not neces-
sary: where a husband was willing WD provide for his widow.
38. Applicable only in cases where the decedent left a will, a typical forced share
statute gives the decedent's surviving spouse a choice of taking under the will or accept-
ing a share of the net estate-usually he share which the spouse would have received
had the decedent died intestate. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-4 (1) (1963).
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statutes provide better protection than dower by including all prop-
erty of the estate of the decedent-personal as well as real-they
are less protective in that only the property which passes through
the estate of the testator is included in the computation of the
widow's forced share. Thus, any property conveyed by inter vivos
transfer is excluded from computation. As a result, the statutory
forced share as currently in force in most non-community property
jurisdictions can be criticized as not providing the intended pro-
tection. The reviewers of the Uniform Probate Code considered this
problem in the drafting of the code, 9 and arrived at the "augment-
ed estate" concept to be used in computation of a spouse's forced
share. Before considering this controversial concept, a considera-
tion of whether this state should enact any spousal protection stat-
ute is in order, especially in light of the fact that the state legis-
lature has never yet felt the necessity to enact any forced share
protection statute. It may be that preventing a decedent from dis-
inheriting his spouse is an area in which a legislature should not
concern itself. However, if a state interest is involved, the legis-
lature must decide what method of protection is most reasonably
calculated to best promote that interest.
In the great majority of cases, a surviving spouse is well taken
care of either by the state's estate plan of intestate distribution or
by the conscious action of the decedent in making a will. That is
not to say that the disinherison of a spouse never occurs. In the
situation where a testator has disinherited his wife, his motives are
ordinarily one of two: either he has properly taken care of his wife
in other ways-by insurance or other methods of inter vivos trans-
fer; or he intentionally, for rational or irrational reasons of his own,
preferred that she should not participate in the distribution of his
wealth. In the former situation, a forced share statute is of no
help, and is in fact a liability, since it detracts from an otherwise
equitable wealth transfer plan devised by the testator. In the. latter
situation, if the husband's motives are in fact improper, the forced
share as it presently exists is of no help either since the husband
can avoid the operation of the forced share statute by conveying
away his property prior to his death-either through a trust device
or by absolute conveyance.
In many states a husband is required by law to support his
family.4 0 It is an interesting anomaly to recognize this duty as suf-
ficiently important to be required by the state during life and yet
not require a similar mandate upon the death of the husband. The
29. See UN oRM PRORATE CODE Article 2, Part 2, General Comment.
4C. "Duty to support. -The husband must support himself and his wife out of his
property or by his labor .... N.D. Csnr. CoDE § 14-07-03 (1971).
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state interest recognized in the first instance 4 1 is just as valid when
considering the support of a surviving spouse who had been disin-
herited.
As mentioned above, under a typical forced share statute the
surviving spouse is entitled to elect against the will and take her
intestate share instead. This type of statute is unsatisfactory be-
cause it is limited to a share of the net estate and does not allow
for any evasive depletion of the decedent's wealth prior to his
death. Thus, any testator who wished to deprive his wife of this
share would only have to convey his property prior to his death;
the surviving spouse would take her intestate share-of nothing.
This inequitable result led to several theories by which courts at-
tempted to defeat the testator's intent. The most obvious attack
was to call a particular transfer prior to death a "fraud" on the
statutory share and thus voidable as against public policy. This ap-
proach has been codified in some forced share statutes.4 2 The fraud
tests required the court to rule on the motive of the decedent. If
his intent was to avoid the statutory forced share, the transfer was
voidable.43 A separate test was established by the New York courts
which looked to the adequacy of the transfer. The question under
this test was whether the testator had actually and realistically
parted with his property or merely hid it by illusory transfer.4 This
seemed to be a more objective test than the fraud approach. Un-
fortunately, this was not always the case, since the equities of a
particular case usually prevailed over a strict application of the
illusory test.4 5 Additionally, since this test turned on the degree of
control retained by the testator during his life its use endangered
the utility of inter vivos trusts generally.
New York has recently attempted to solve the "net estate"
problem without using either of the above-mentioned tests. That
state now provides for the inclusion of various testamentary substi-
tutes in the computation of the estate for forced share purposes.
48
41. Public support of the impoverished spouse is clearly of sufficient state interest to
Justify "duty to support" statutes. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-03 (1971).
42. See, e.g., TENN. CoDE ANN. § 31-612 (1955) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 473 (1958).
43. There were several problems In making the subjective judgment as to what had
been the decedent's motive. Of course the decedent himself was not available, so only
hearsay testimony could be used. Additionally, surviving documents failed to provide
much assistance, since they were more likely to reflect the expertise of counsel rather
than the state of mind of the testator.
44. The test is defined by the Court of Appeals of New York In Newman v. Dore, 275
N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937): "[T]he only sound test of the validity of a challenged
transfer is whether it is real or illusory. . . . [t]he test applied is essentially whether
the husband has in good faith divested himself of ownership of his property .... " Id.
at 969.
45. See, e.g., Denver Nat'l. Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
46. Gifts causa mortis, bank account trusts and joint tenancy property would be In-
cluded in this "forced share estate." N.Y. EPTL § 5-1.1 (b) (McKinney 1967).
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This method is conceptually the same as the augmented estate ap-
proach under the Uniform Probate Code.
IV. THE AUGMENTED ESTATE
The augmented estate concept is useful in North Dakota not
only for the protection it provides against disinheritance of the sur-
viving spouse by allowing him or her to elect to take one-third of
the decedent's estate, but also because it does so in a manner de-
void of the many problems encountered by the courts in jurisdic-
tions enacting traditional forced share statutes. 7 The augmented
estate begins where the forced share statutes left off-the net es-
tate.48  To this is added the value of property transferred during
the marriage (to anyone other than the spouse) for which the de-
cedent did not receive "adequate and full consideration."4 9 This
provision is an attempt to avoid the problem of traditional forced
share statutes which compelled courts to apply either the fraud test
or the illusory test to set aside an inter-vivos transfer by which a
decedent had attempted to defeat the statute °
To this sum is added the value of certain properties owned by
or transferred by the surviving spouse at any time during the mar-
riage, which property was derived from the decedent and which
would have been included in the surviving spouse's augmented es-
tate had the spouse predeceased the decedent.5 1 This third compo-
nent in the augmented estate calculation has the effect of increas-
ing the size of the estate with property already benefiting the sur-
viving spouse, thus decreasing his or her share in other property.52
47. The Code's concept of a net estate is comprised of a three-part computation
which at first seems very complex. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE Article 2, Part 2, General
Comment. The augmented estate is intended to provide traditional "forced-share" pro-
tection for the spouse without the possibility of a decedent defeating it by inter vivos
transfer; but the method of computation also prevents a surviving spouse from electing
a forced share when he or she has been adequately provided for other than by will.
Id. at 30, 33.
48. The computation to determine the size of the augmented estate begins with the
decedent's wealth at death reduced by funeral and administration expensas, homestead
and family allowances, and enforceable claims. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (effective
July 1, 1975).
49. Not all such transfers are included, but only those types specified in subsection(1), such as: transfers where decedent retained "possession. or enjoyment of, or right to
income from, the property" at the time of his death; where decedent retained power
to revoke or consume principal for his own benefit; where decedent held property in
Joint tenancy with right of survivorship with someone other than the surviving spouse;
of any transfers which aggregate in excess of $3,0C0 to one dome for either of the two
years immediately preceding decedent's death. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (1) (effea-
tive July 1, 1975).
50. See notes 42 to 45 supra and accompanying text.
51. N.D. CENT. COD § 30.1-05-02(2) (a). Such Property includes the interest in a
trust created for the surviving spouse's benefit by the decedent's life insurance payable
to the surviving spouse and certain annuities Payable to the surviving spouse.
52. It has this effect because, while it increases the size of the estate, the same prop-
erty must be accounted for by the surviving spouse in, satisfying the elective share.
"[P]roperty which is part of the augmented estate which . . . has passed to the sur-
viving spouse . . . is applied first to satisfy the elective share...." N.D. CENT. CoE
3.0.1-05-07(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
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Since the Code establishes a presumption that all property owned by
the surviving spouse has been derived from the decedent, the burden
of showing that the property in this component was not so de-
rived is on the surviving spouse.53
The Code's elective share is one-third of the total augmented
estate54 and must be petitioned for within six months of the first
publication of the notice to creditors.5 5 After a hearing to determine
the value of the augmented estate, the court must order payment
to the spouse from the assets of the augmented estate.50 If these
are insufficient, the court will order contribution from the original
recipients of assets of the augmented estate. 57 It may be necessary
to proceed against a recipient of assets of the augmented estate if
voluntary contribution from him is not forthcoming.5 8
The election does not affect the statutory entitlement of a sur-
viving spouse to a homestead allowance, exempt property or family
allowance.5 9 Nor does it affect the distribution of property which,
without election, would have passed under the will or by intestacy
to the surviving spouse; such property "is applied first to satisfy
the elective share and to reduce the amount due from other recipi-
ents" of the assets of the augmented estate. 0
The authors of the Uniform Probate Code recognized that the
elective share provisions should not prevent specialized estate plan-
ning. They accordingly provided that a spouse may, after fair dis-
closure, waive not only elective rights but also the homestead,
exempt property, and family allowances either before or after mar-
riage. 1
V. ADOPTION AND THE CODE
The Uniform Probate Code 2 is in accord with the spirit of the
Revised Uniform Adoption ActV3 as to an adopted person's legal
53. Nl.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(2)(c) (effective July 1, 1975).
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30'.1-05-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-05 (1) (effective July 1, 1975).
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-C5-05 (4) (effective July 1, 1975).
57. Id. Only original transferees or those receiving from them without consideration
are subject to contribution. A bona fide purchaser for value would not be required to
assist in making up the elective share. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-.1-05-07(3) (effective July
1, 1975).
58. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05(5) (effective July 1, 1975).
59. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-06(2) (efective July 1, 1975).
60. N.D. CINT. CODE § CJ.V-05-0q(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-04 (effective July 1, 1975). The section was intended
for parties to second and subsequent marriages "to insure that property derived
from prior spouses passes at death to the Issue of the prior spouses instead of to the
newly acquired spouse," (UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-204, Comment), but is of course not
limited to that situation.
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-0-4-09(1) (effective July 1, 1975) defines the rights ac-
cruing to the parties to an adoption relationship for the purposes of intestate succession.
63. The Revised Uniform Adoption Act [hereinafter referred to as Adoption Act]
was enacted in 1971. N.D. CENT. COD § 14-15-01 to 23 (1971).
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relationship with his adoptive parents in matters of inheritance."
While the Adoption Code may be subject to interpretative difficulty,
however, the Code is not. The Adoption Act provides that
[t] he relationship of parent and child [is created] be-
tween [the parent] and the adopted individual, as if the adopt-
ed individual were a legitimate blood descendant of the pe-
titioner [adoptive parent] for all purposes including inheri-
tance. .... 65
It is clear that the Act provides that adopted persons are entitled
to inherit from their adoptive parents and that adoptive parents are
entitled to inherit from the children they adopt. However, since the
Act is speaking specifically of the relationship existing between the
adoptive parent and the adopted person, it could be questioned
whether this applies to inheritance from the adopting parents' col-
laterals. In the case of Hoellinger v. Molzhon,66 language similar
to that in section 14-15-14 (1) (b) of the Adoption Act was said to
create a "relationship of parent or parents and child .. . as against
all the world."'6 7 In that case, the court allowed the decedent's
adopted grandchildren to inherit their adoptive parents' shares un-
der the adoptive parents' mother's will in accord with an anti-lapse
statute.68 While this decision may be helpful, it is not compelling.
The anti-lapse provision merely provided for a substitute legatee,
and so it could be said that even in Hoellinger the adopted children
were inheriting from their parents, not through them; the "all the
world" language is thus dictum.
A more accurate example of the problem would be where A
dies intestate without wife or issue, survived only by his brother,
B, and an adopted child, D, of A's brother C. Under the Adop-
tion Act, B could argue that while the Act provides for the parent-
child relationship between C and D, it does not speak to the rela-
tionship between A and D. Since adoption was unknown to the com-
mon law, the status of the relationships of an adopted person to his
adoptive parent and the parent's relatives are determined by stat-
ute. Strictly inerpreting section 14-15-14 (1) (b) of the Adoption Act,6 9
64. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-14(1)(b) (1971) seems, Initially at least, to place
adopted children In the same position as natural children would be for purposes of In-
heritance.
65. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-14(1) (b) (1971).
66. Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 77 N.D. 1018, 41 N.W.2d 217 (1950).
67. Id. at 220. The adoption statute in effect at that time stated that the adopted child
"shall be deemed, (the child of the adoptive parent] as respects all legal conequences
and incidents of the natural relation of Varent and child." N.D. REv. CODE § 14-11-13
(1943) (emphasis added).
68. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-0'4-20 (1972).
69. The common law rule of strict interpretation of statutes in derogation of the
common law is not applicable to the Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (1959).
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there is no declaration of D's relationship to A. Thus, he may not
be entitled to inherit from A, the Hoellinger case notwithstanding.
There is no similar problem with the Adoption Act in consider-
ing inheritance by the adopted person from or through his natural
parents. The Adoption Act is clear on this point: "All legal rela-
tionships between the adopted individual and his relatives" are ter-
minated and he "thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives
for all purposes including inheritance. ' 70 It is evident that this sec-
tion does not have the possibility of misinterpretation that is present
under subsection (b).
The Code provides a solution by specifically stating that the
adoption of a person grants him the right of inheritance by, from
and through his adoptive parent.7 1
The Code also severs all legal relationships between the adopted
child and his natural parent,7 2 with the obvious exception of where
a stepparent adopts his spouse's natural child.7 8 Unfortunately, the
Code makes no reference to the status of the child's relationship
with his other natural parent in this situation.
74
A problem related to inheritance by adopted children is the
status of children born out of wedlock. At common law, bastards
could not inherit since they were filius nullius (no one's child).75 By
statute in most jurisdictions they may now inherit from their na-
tural mother and in certain instances from their natural father.
Typically, the child was in all cases considered the heir of his
mother; he was heir to his father only where the father acknowledg-
ed paternity by witnessed written instrument. 76 The term "heir,"
70, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-14(1) (a) (1971) (emphasis added).
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09 (effective July 1, 1975).
72. N.D. CENT. COD § 30.1-04.-09(1) (effective July 1, 1975). This inconsistent with
the Adoption Act. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-14(1) (a) (1971).
73. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
74. In certain instances it is not necessary that both parents consent to an adoption
(see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-05, 14-15-06 (1971)). Thus it would be possible for a
child to be adopted by his natural mother's spouse and be legally severed from any pos-
sibility of inheriting by, from or through his natural father in spite of the fact that
neither the child nor his natural father has consented to the adoption.
75. ATKINSON, WILLS 40 (2d ed. 1953).
76. The North Dakota statute relating to inheritance by illegitimates was, until 1969,
typical:
Inheritance by child born out of wedlock.-Every child born out of wedlock
is an heir of the person who in writing signed in the presence of a compe-
tent witness acknowledges himself to be the father of such child. In all
cases such child is an heir of his mother. He inherits the father's or mother's
estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner as if
he had been born in lawful wedlock. He, however, does not represent his
father or mother by inheriting any part of the estate of the kindred of his
father or mother, either lineal or collateral, unless before his death his par-
ents shall have intermarried and his father after such marriage shall have
acknowledged him as his child or adopted him into his family. In that case
such child and all the legitimate children in such family are considered
brothers and sisters and on the death of any one of them intestate and
without issue the others, subject to the rights in the estate of such deceased
child of the father and mother, respectively, as is provided in this code.
NORTH DAKOTA PROBATE CODE
was used in a limited sense, however, in that the child was not the
heir of his mother or acknowledged father with respect to inheri-
tance "of the estate of the kindred of his father or mother" unless
they had inter-married and his father "adopted him into his family"
or acknowledged him."
Essentially there are two problems with this type of statute.
First, the illegitimate child is discriminated against because he must
satisfy two conditions before being placed in the same status as
legitimates for the purpose of inheriting through his parents. Sec-
ond, they allow a father to openly acknowledge an illegitimate child
at any time, even after that child's death prior to the death of the
father, allowing the father to take as an heir even though he re-
fused to acknowledge the child as his during his lifetime.78
The first problem was constitutionally fatal to the North Dakota
statute. In 1968 in In re Estate of Jensen,79 the North Dakota Su-
preme Court held the North Dakota statute unconstitutional as a
violation of equal protection"° because it discriminated invidiously
between legitimates and illegitimates.18 Subsequent to Jensen, the
North Dakota Legislature revised and reenacted the North Dakota
statute to conform to the Jensen decision. 82 Both problems previ-
ously mentioned would seem to have been solved by the revised
statute: illegitimates were expressly permitted to inherit not only
from their natural parents but also from collateral and lineal heirs
of their parents. Also, the statute did away with any requirement of
written acknowledgment of paternity; thus, illegitimates were to be
considered as the natural children of their parents for inheritance
purposes. As a result of Jensen and the revised statute, North Da-
inherit his estate as his heirs in the same manner as if all the children had
been born in wedlock. The issue of all marriages null in law or dissolved
by divorce are deeemd to have been born In wedlock.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (1960).
77. Thus, in no way could the illegitimate inherit through his parents without two
requirements first being saisfied: 1) his parents must have Intermarried; and, 2) his
father must have acknowledged him.
78. It would be unusual for a father who was unwilling to acknowledge his Illegiti-
mate child during that child's life to acknowledge the child after his death; unusual
only because seldom would the child leave an estate of sufficient substance to make such
acknowledgement worthwhile. Nonetheless, it is an act which should not be given support
by the state.
79. Itn re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968).
80. The court held N.D. CENT. CoDs § 56-01-05 unconstitutional as violating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Section 20 of the North Dakota Constitution. Id. at 879.
81. The court based its decision on the 1968 United States Supreme Court case of
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) which held that denying illegitimates the right to
sue in wrongful death actions was a violation of their right to equal protection of the law.
82. The statute now reads:
Inheritance by child out of wedlock.-Every child is hereby declared to be
the legitimate child of his natural parents, and is entitled to support and
education, to the same extent as if he had been born in lawful wedlock, He
shall inherit from his natural parents, and from their kindred heir, lineal
and collateral. The issue of all marriages null in law or dissolved by divorce
are deemed to have been born in wedlock.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (1972).
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kota had perhaps a more enlightened and progressive attitude to-
wards illegitimates than any other state.
It is in this one area that the Uniform Probate Code is a re-
gressive step for North Dakota. Under the Code, 5 for the purpose
of inheritance, the child born out of wedlock is the child of his
mother, but is the child of the father only if the parents have gone
through a marriage ceremony, 4 or if paternity is established by
adjudication. 5 Presumably, a written acknowledment is not satis-
factory since the Code speaks expressly of "adjudication." 8 6 In
this regard, the Code section is not only regressive when compared
with the revised statute but is not much better than the statute
declared unconstitutional in Jensen. The only factor in favor of the
Code section is the provision that the paternity adjudication is in-
effective to qualify the father (or his kindred) to inherit from or
through the child without an open acknowledgment by the father of
paternity.8 7
While the Code provision would likely meet the constitutional
test of Jensen, it is certainly not a progressive step for North Da-
kota.8
83. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
84. Whether the marriage is valid, voidable or void is of no Importance as long as
the couple has attempted to become married. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09(2) (a)
(effective July 1, 1975).
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09(2) (b) (effective July 1, 1975). Paternity is estab-
lished by adjudication prior to the father's death or, if after the father's death, by clear
and convincing proof.
86. It is likely that if the paternity issue Is in question after the father's death, a
written acknowledgment will satisfy the "clear and convincing" requirement.
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09(2)(b) (effective July 1, 1975). The reason for
this provision is to prevent the reluctant father from reaping a benefit without recog-
nizing his obligation fo the child. See note 78 supra.
88. Jensen is likely to be a lonely decision. Three years after the North Dakota Supreme
Court rendered the Jensen decision, the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity
in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) to review the constitueionality of a statute
similar to that considered in Jensen. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black,
refused to hold the statute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause stating that the
laws relating to intestate succession and its regulation were of major state ooncern. Id.
at 537.
Recently, however, the Court may have retreated from this position. In Gomez v.
Perez, 93 S. Ct. 872 (1973) citing Levy but making no reference to Labine, the Court
held that " a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by deny-
ing them substantial benefits accorded children generally." Id. at 875. Granted, the
Gomez case was dealing with the problem of illegitimates in the context of the duty of
natural parents to support, but the opinion would seem broad enough for application to
the Labine and Jensen situations.
In any event, even though the Court in Labine held a statute similar to the
Code section pertaining to illegitimaties as not in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution, that decision, of course, has no effect on the
Jensen decision holding a similar statute in violation of Section 20 of the North Dakota
Constitution. Thus there is a possibility that a North Dakota court relying on the ra-
tionale of Jensen would declare section 30.1-04-09 an unconstitutional violation of Section
20 of the North Dakota Constitution.
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VI. ADVANCEMENTS UNDER THE CODE
An advancement is a gift in anticipation of what a child or
other lineal descendant will be entitled to at the death of the de-
cedent dying intestate. 9 When a gift is determined to have been
an advancement, the recipient of that gift must take it into account
as part of his share. The process by which this is done is called
"hotch-pot," a bookkeeping maneuver which consists of adding the
amount of the advancement to the total of the estate, dividing by
the number of shares into which the estate is to be divided, and
then reducing the share of the recipient of the advancement by the
amount that his share was anticipated by the advancement.
Whether a transfer prior to the death of a North Dakota inte-
state is an advancement is covered by statute.90 This pre-Code stat-
ute classifies a gift as an advancement only where such intent was
expressed in the gift itself, or charged in writing by the donor, or
acknowledged in writing by the recipient. 91 Under the Code, a gift
is an advancement when declared so in a writing executed contem-
poraneously with the gift or when the recipient states in writing that
the gift is merely in anticipation of his intestate share of the de-
cedent's estate. 92
A significant difference between the prior law and the Code is
that the prior law speaks of advancements only in regard to chil-
dren or other lineal descedants 93 while the Code refers to "heirs.""
Thus, any person entitled to take a part of the decedent's estate
under the scheme of intestate succession 8 who has received an ad-
vancement must, if he wishes to participate in the distribution of
the estate, allow his advancement to be accounted for in determin-
ing his share.
Another distinction between the prior law and the Code relates
to the advancement of a recipient who predeceases the decedent.
Under prior law, the representatives of the deceased recipient were
to account for his advancement. 98 The Code, however, does not take
this into account in computing the share which the recipient's chil-
dren may take unless the contrary intent is evidenced in the con-
temporaneous declaration or the acknowledgment."
89. ATKINSON, WILLS § 129 at 716 et seq. (2d ed. 1953).
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-21-14 (1960).
91. rd.
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-10 (effective July 1, 1975).
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-21-12 (1960). This Itself is an extension. Most advancement
statutes apply only to children. IV VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 239 at 114-15
(1936).
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-10 (effective July 1, 1975). An "heir" is defined by
the Code as referring to collaterals and the surviving spouse as well as children and
lineal descendants. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-01-06(18) (effective July 1, 1975).
95. N .D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-01, 02, 03 (effective July 1, 1975).
96. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-21-16 (1960').
97. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-10 (effective July 1, 1975).
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VI. TESTAMENTARY EXECUTION UNDER THE CODE
The Code has made some changes in the availability and ways
of executing wills in North Dakota. The Code greatly simplifies the
execution of wills by reducing the formalities to a minimum.9 The
Code makes no requirement that the testator "declare" or "publish"
the document as his will; neither must he request the witnesses to
sign nor must they witness it in the presence of the testator or of
each other. Further, the requirement that a testator's signature be
"at the end thereof" is no longer included.99
There is no Code provision allowing for the valid execution of
an oral or nuncupative will. 100 Typically, nuncupative wills are strict-
ly limited by statute.101 While there has not been much litigation re-
garding oral wills, it has often been said that they are disfavored by
the law and that statutes allowing them should be strictly limited. 02
There is little possibility that the absence of a provision allowing
for nuncupative wills in the Code will have much effect. There has
never been litigation in a North Dakota court of record in refer-
ence to the validity of a nuncupative will.103 The relatively infrequent
use of these wills, plus the fact that formal written wills may be
executed with relatively little formality under the Code, justifies the
failure to provide for oral wills.
The Code does allow for the execution of holographic, or hand-
written, unwitnessed wills. Statutes providing for holographic wills
have, because of the exceptional nature of this form of testament,
been strictly interpreted. Thus, where a statute requires that the
will "be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the tes-
tator,'104 those requirements must be strictly followed. The Code
somewhat liberalizes these requirements by providing that only the
testator's signature and the material provisions of the will must be
in the testator's own hand. 03 Under the Code, a holographic will
would not be invalid because of a mechanically applied date or be-
cause it happened to contain the signature of a witness. It would
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
99. Id.
100. Prior to the Code, North Dakota provided for oral wills. N.D. CFNT. CODE 5
56-03-03 (1960).
101. The North Dakota statute prior to the Code relating to nuncupative wills was
typical. It did not allow the value of the estate bequeathed to exceed $1,000 and it had
to be proved by two witnesses who were present at the making of the will. Additionally
the will was valid only if the decedent was in military service in the field in actual con-
templation, fear or peril of death; doing duty on shipboard at sea in actual contempla-
tion, fear or peril of death; or in expectation of immediate death from an injury re-
ceived that same day. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-03-03 (1960).
102. In re Taylor's Estate, 56 Ariz. 211, 106 P.2d 492 (1940) ; Godfrey v. Smith, 73
Neb. 756, 103 N.W. 450 (1905).
103. Which of course is not to say that some testators have not utilized this device.
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-03-04 (1972).
1C,5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
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seem that the Code would allow as a valid holograph, the typical
printed form will filled in by the testator in his own hand, since
the testator would have provided, the "material provisions" him-
self.
The Code provides that a formal will may be "self-proved"
either at the time of execution or later, by a notarized acknowledg-
ment by the testator and affidavit of witnesses.106 The effect of the
self-proving process is to indicate conclusively the compliance with
the signature requirements and to prove presumptively all the other
requirements of execution. 10
Because of the possibility of fraud, at common law a witness
who had a financial interest in the will was incompetent.18 Incom-
petency of one of the prescribed number of competent witnesses pre-
vented valid execution; this was true even if the interested witness
later renounced his gift under the will. Many jurisdictions now allow
or require an interested witness to give up his giftloo or at least
that portion in excess of what the witness would take if the will
were declared invalid.110 The Code recognizes the questionable ef-
fect of such statutes and specifically provides that a will is not in-
valid because of a witness' interest."1
This section may be the subject of future interpretive litigation.
It could be determined that it means an interest at the time of
execution, effectively forcing the witness to give up his gift as was
required under prior law.112 The official comment to the Code, how-
ever, states that this section does not forfeit a gift to an interest-
ed witness.11'
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has touched on only a few of the areas of the
substantive law affected by the enactment of the Uniform Probate
Code in North Dakota. The Code itself covers many other areas of
reform; these include probate and administration procedures, pro-
tection of persons under legal disability, non-probate transfers of
property and trust administration. The omission of these areas from
this analysis stems more from the exigencies of time and inclina-
tion than their lack of effect on North Dakota law; on the contrary,
106. N.D. CENT. OoDS § 30.1-08-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
107. N.D. CE'T. CODE § 30.1-15-06(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
108. ATKINSON, WILLS 309 (2d ed. 1953).
109. Typical was N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-21 (1972) prior to adoption of the Uniform
Probate Code.
110. N.D. CENT. Coon § 56-0.4-22 (1972).
111. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-05(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
112. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-21 (1972).
118. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-505, comment at 49.
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there are many changes in these areas which should be brought to
the attention of the Bar. Hopefully, in the two years before the
Code becomes effective, comprehensive analyses of these problem
areas will be forthcoming.
